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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996' ("1996 Act") was to promote
competition in the local exchange telecommuni-
cations marketplace-the last vestige of the tele-
communications monopoly.2 Congress aimed to
alter the competitive landscape of local telecom-
munications by splitting the integrated local
phone market into its wholesale and retail compo-
nents.i In the post-1996 Act environment, firms
seeking to offer retail local telephone services
need not construct a local exchange network, but
may offer services by acquiring the necessary facil-
ities in a wholesale market where such facilities
are bought and sold.
When the 1996 Act was signed into law in Feb-
ruary 1996, however, the only firms capable of
supplying the wholesale market in each local mar-
* An earlier version of this paper appeared as Bell Compa-
nies as Profitable Wholesale Firms: The Financial Implications of
UNE-P, at http://www.phoenix-center.org (Nov. 2002). The
estimation methodology has changed significantly from the
earlier version, and follows George S. Ford, The Myth of Below-
Cost UNE-P Prices, at http://www.telepolicy.com (unpublished
manuscript) (Feb. 2003). T. Randolph Beard is Professor of
Economics at Auburn University; George S. Ford is Chief
Economist at Z-Tel Communications; and Christopher C.
Klein is Professor of Economics at Middle Tennessee State
University, Murfreesboro, Tenn. and is former Chief Econo-
mist for the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. We thank
Larry Spiwak for helpful comments and for assistance in pre-
paring the manuscript for publication, and Bob Loube for
his comments and recommendations arising out of his care-
ful review of our calculations. Any remaining errors are the
responsibility of the authors.
I Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
2 See H. R. REp. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996).
" See Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467
(2002). "Congress ... aim[ed] to ... reorganize markets."
Id. at 489. "[W]holesale markets for companies engaged in
resale, leasing, or interconnection of facilities cannot be cre-
ated without addressing rates." Id. at 492. "The Act ...
favor[ed] ... novel ratesetting designed to give aspiring com-
ket were the incumbent local exchange carriers,
or "ILECs." A similar situation persists today.
Consequently, the wholesale prices of these
wholesale monopolists were to be regulated and
based on "cost,"4 defined by the Federal Commu-
nications Commissions ("FCC") as total element
long run incremental cost ("TELRIC")..
5
While the FCC defined the cost standard, the
state regulatory commissions were assigned the
task of implementing the standard.? Wholesale
prices for unbundled network elements
("UNEs")-that is, the network facilities retail
providers "buy" from the ILEC-have been and
continue to be determined in evidentiary hear-
ings before each state's respective regulatory com-
mission.
The 1996 Act has led to increased competition
in many local telecommunications markets,
petitors every possible incentive to enter local retail tele-
phone markets." Id. at 489. For a full discussion of the opin-
ion and current FCC broadband initiatives, see Lawrence J.
Spiwak, The Telecoms Twilight Zone: Navigating the Legal Morass
Among the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, at http://www.phoenix-center.org/
pcpp/PCPP13Final.pdf (Aug. 2002); Lawrence J. Spiwak,
Opinion: U.S. Competition Policy-The Four Horsemen of the
Broadband Apocalypse, athttp://www.phoenix-center.org/com-
mentaries/CWIHorsemen.pdf (Apr. 1, 2002).
4 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 §252(d) (1) (stat-
ing that the "rate for the interconnection of facilities and
equipment ... shall be based on the cost . . . of providing
the interconnection or network element .... ").
5 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report &
Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, 15515 (1996) [hereinafter Section
251 Order].
6 Id. at para. 29 ("The 1996 Act requires the States to set
prices for interconnection and unbundled elements that are
cost-based, nondiscriminatory, and may include a reasonable
profit.").
7 Letter from Joan Smith and Robert Nelson, Chair and
Co-Vice Chair of the Telecommunications Committee of the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, to
Sen. Thomas Daschle, Senate Majority Leader (Sept. 27,
2002) (on file with authors).
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though generally not to the extent many had
hoped.8 Today, the combination of unbundled el-
ements called "UNE-P" or "UNE-Plafform"-a
combination of unbundled loops, switching,
transport and signaling-is the most successful
mode of competitive entry created by the 1996
Act, and its growth substantially exceeds the alter-
native modes of entry.9 This success has brought
UNE-P under a multifaceted attack by the Bell
Operating Companies ("BOCs").l 0
First, the BOCs argue that UNE-P deters Com-
petitive Local Exchange Carrier ("CLEC") invest-
8 YochiJ. Dreazen, Telecom Crisis Forces FCC Shift; Could Let
a Bell Buy WorldCom, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2002, at Al.
9 PACE COALITION, THE UNE-P FACT REPORT 1-2, at http:/
/www.pacecoalition.org (Jan. 2003).
I(0 See, e.g., SBC CEO at FCC to Fight UNE Platform,
TRDAILV, Sept. 6, 2002, at 2-3; Blaming High UNE Rates, AT&T
Says it, Will Avoid florida, TRDAILY, Sept. 10, 2002, at 7-8; SBC
Urges FCC to 'Clarify' TELRIC in Pending Arbitration, TRDAILY,
Sept. 11, 2002, at 34; House Letter Rekindles Debate Over UNE
Pricing, TRDAILY, Sept. 13, 2002, at 2; USTA's McCormick
Removes Gloves in UNE-P, TELRIC Debate, TRDAILY, Sept. 13,
2002, at 3; SBC's Daley Weighs In On UNE Issue, TRDAILY, Sept.
17, 2002, at 3-4; Martin Opposes Seeking High Court Review of
UNE Ruling, TRDAILY, Sept. 18, 2002, at 5; AT&T Issues Eco-
nomic Study to Bolster UNE Arguments, TRDAILY, Sept. 18, 2002,
at 6; McCain Willing to Consider Resolution on UNE-P, TELRIC,
TRDAILY, Sept. 24, 2002, at 3; Z-7el Questions Bells' UNE-P Fi-
nancial Claims, TRDAjLY, Sept. 24, 2002, at 9; Rep. Pomeroy:
UINE Rates Should Reflect Actual Costs, TRDAILY, Sept. 25, 2002,
at 6; SBC Blames Layoffs on Regulation; Ackerman Warns on UA-
P, TRDALY, Sept. 26, 2002, at 2; SBC's Rivals Question Firm's
Motivation for Layoffs; Some Analysts Say Financial Pressure Is
Real, TRDAILY, Sept. 27, 2002, at 7-8; Glenn Bischoff, USTA
Calls For the End of UNE-P, TELRIC, at http://
www.telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom-ustacallsend_2/in-
dex.htm (Sept. 13, 2002). See also Press Release, SBC, More
Than 100 Members of Congress Call for Changes to "Per-
verse" Telecommunications Regulations (Sept. 17, 2002) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter SBC Press Release] (where, ac-
cording to SBC President Richard Daley, TELRIC pricing is
"below cost" and is an "irrational and unsustainable subsidy
that is threatening the future of our nation's telecommunica-
tions infrastructure"); Seidenberg Says UNE-P Is "Manageable Is-
sue" For Verizon, WASH. TELECOM NEWSWIRE, Sept. 9, 2002 (ac-
cording to Verizon Chief Executive Officer Ivan Seidenberg:
"'State commissions don't get it. They don't have a clue be-
cause they are trapped' in an old view of regulatory policy.").
Such criticisms are particularly puzzling given that the Bells
publicly reported to the FCC that States imposed TELRIC
pricing as a pre-condition of receiving authority under Sec-
tion 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to provide
in-region inter-LATA service. See, e.g., Ex parte Letter from
Gordon R. Evans, Vice President Federal Affairs, Verizon, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, Verizon Petition for
Emergency Declaratory and Other Relief, WC Dkt. No. 02-
202, In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, CC Dkt.
No. 01-338, Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt. No.
96-98, and Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Ad-
ment and deployment of switching equipment.
This claim, however, does not survive
econometric scrutiny.'' Second, and more re-
cently, the BOCs have begun to criticize the state
regulatory commissions by accusing the commis-
sions of incorrectly applying TELRIC in their de-
terminations of wholesale prices.12 One claim is
that the state commissions disregard "true" costs
when they set wholesale prices, and instead
choose wholesale prices that ensure sizeable mar-
gins for CLEC entrants.' 3 Again, empirical evi-
dence does not support the BOCs' claim in this
vanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Dkt. No. 98-147,
at 16 (Aug. 16, 2002) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Let-
ter from Evans to Dortch]. See also financial analyses cited
infra Part II, pp 108-112.
1 1 See T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford and Thomas
M. Koutsky, Mandated Access and the Make-or-Buy Decision: The
Case of Local Telecommunications Competition, at http://
www.telepolicy.com/BFKFinal.pdf (unpublished manuscript)
(2002). See also, PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY
BULLETIN No. 4: The Truth About Telecommunications Invest-
ment, at http://www.phoenix-center.org/PolicyBulletin/Poli-
cyBulletin4Final.pdf (June 24, 2003); PHOENIX CENTER FOR
ADVANCED LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES,
PHOENIX CENTER POLICY BULLETIN No. 5: Competition and
Bell Company Investment in Telecommunications Plant: The
Effects of UNE-P, at http://www.phoenix-center.org/Poli-
cyBulletin/PolicyBulletin.pdf (Sept. 17, 2003); PHOENIX
CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY
STUDIES, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY BULLETIN No. 6: UNE-P
Drives Bell Investments: A Synthesis Model, at http://
www.phoenix-center.org/PolicyBulletin/PolicyBulle-
tin6fFnal.pdf (Sept. 17, 2003); PHOENIX CENTER FOR AD-
VANCED LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, PHOE-
NIX CENTER POLICY BULLETIN No. 7: The Positive Effects of
Competition on Employment in the Telecommunications In-
dustry, at http://www.phoenix-center.org/PolicyBulletiri
PolicyBulletin7ffnal.pdf (Oct. 15, 2003).
12 Qwest Joins Bells' Call for Refining TELRIC Standards,
TRDAILY, Sept. 27, 2002, at 4 (reporting that Qwest wrote a
letter to FCC Chairman Michael Powell claiming that a "wide
gulf separates TELRIC as it was originally conceived from
TELRIC as it is now being applied in many States."); SBC
Urges FCC to 'Clarify' TELRIC in Pending Arbitration, TRDAILY,
Sept. 11, 2002, at 3 [hereinafter SBC Uges FCC] ("SBC says
some of the key inputs being used in state cost proceedings
are 'at odds with market realities and inconsistent with the
core assumptions inherent in TELRIC itself."'); Ex Parte Let-
ter from Robert T. Blau, Vice President-Executive and Fed-
eral Regulatory Affairs, BellSouth, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec-
retary, FCC, In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Un-
bundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carri-
ers, CC Dkt. No. 01-338 (Aug. 28, 2002) (on file with au-
thors) ("Some state PSCs have abandoned any semblance of
cost (including TELRIC) in setting wholesale rates.") [here-
inafter Letter from Blav to Dortch].
13 See, e.g., SBC Press Release, supra note 10; see also SBC
Urges FCC, supra note 12 (quoting the SBC President William
Daily as stating that "in some cases, state regulatory commis-
sions 'make no attempt even to determine the correct input'
[Vol. 12
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regard. ' 4
An alternate, but related claim, is that whole-
sale prices for UNE-P do not cover the BOCs' ac-
tual operational costs for supplying a switched ac-
cess line.15 Financial analysts have fueled the
BOCs' claims against UNE-P, suggesting that reve-
nues from UNE-P are insufficient to cover operat-
ing costs, but the accuracy of the calculations
made by these analysts on both the revenue and
cost sides of the issue has been questioned."!
In this paper, we consider the claims of the
BOCs, and the related claims of the financial ana-
lysts' reports. Specifically, we provide revenue
and cost estimates for the BOCs' switched access
lines at both the retail and wholesale level. Our
approach is more direct than that of the financial
analysts who have typically used completely arbi-
trary means by which to infer costs. Since public
data allows for the more direct calculation of
wholesale operating costs, the degree of arbitrari-
ness can be reduced substantially. Further, the
cost detail provided in the data allows for better
estimates of avoided costs, since certain expenses
are avoided (e.g., billing, marketing and customer
service) while others are passed along to the
CLEC serving the customer (e.g., access
charges).17
The relationship between UNE-P revenues and
wholesale costs requires estimates of revenues.
UNE-P revenues realized by the BOCs, however,
are not easily computed, at least not correctly. To
evaluate the reasonableness of the BOCs' claims
regarding UNE-P and "actual" costs, we rely on ac-
tual, per-line payments to BOCs by a CLEC using
UNE-P to provide service in forty-six states. The
service offerings of this CLEC are comparable to
for the TELRIC model .... Instead, they choose inputs that
will achieve a predetermined end-result: a TELRIC rate that
will give AT&T the 45% margin it demands before it will
enter local markets' using ... UNE-P."); accord, Letter from
Blau to Dortch, supra note 12 ("Some state PSCs have aban-
doned any semblance of cost (including TELRIC) in setting
wholesale rates, and instead are increasing resale discounts to
levels that AT&T and other CLECs claim they need to oper-
ate profitably in residential markets").
14 T. Randolph Beard and George S. Ford, What Deter-
mines Wholesale Prices for Network Elements in Telephony? An
Econometric Evaluation, at http://www.phoenix-center.org/
pcpp/PCPI6.pdf (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Beard & Ford
2002].
15 See, e.g., SBC Press Release, supra note 10; see also Let-
ter from Evans to Dortch, supra note 10.
16 Beard & Ford 2002, supra note 14; Ex Parte Letter from
Robert Curtis, President, and Thomas Koutsky, Vice Presi-
dent, Law and Public Policy, Z-Tel Communications, Inc., to
other CLECs and the firm provides wholesale ser-
vices to numerous, large CLECs.18 Thus, we have
no reason to believe this choice materially affects
the findings of the analysis.
The balance of this paper is outlined as follows.
In Section II, we briefly discuss the relationship
between TELRIC and current operating costs.
Generally, TELRIC does not address the revenues
needed to cover current or embedded opera-
tional costs or depreciation. TELRIC-derived
prices may or may not cover such costs. Thus, the
BOCs' claims regarding wholesale prices and
profit margins based on embedded costs have no
meaningful connection to the correct application
of TELRIC. Next, in Section III, we present esti-
mates for the BOCs' per-line revenues for UNE-P.
We then describe our computation of wholesale
costs in Section IV. Computed gross and net
profit margins are presented in Section V. We ig-
nore the implications of long-distance margins on
the BOCs' financials. Our approach focuses
solely on the BOCs as a wholesale provider of lo-
cal telecommunications plant. The broader pol-
icy issues related to competition across telecom-
munications markets are left for others to debate.
In Section VI, we briefly consider the validation of
our findings. Concluding comments are provided
in Section VII.
II. CURRENT COSTS, EMBEDDED COSTS,
AND TELRIC
Recent financial analyses by Commerce Capital
Markets, Inc. ("CCM"), 19 Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc. ("ML"), 20 and UBS Warburg ("UBS") 2 1 have
focused attention on the general charge by BOCs
Michael Powell et al., FCC, Dkt. No. 01-338 (Sept. 23, 2002)
(on file with authors) [hereinafter Letter from Curtis and
Koutsky to Powell]; Ex Parte Letter from Donna Sorgi,
WorldCom, Inc. to Michael Powell et al., FCC, Dkt. No. 01-
338 (Sept. 16, 2002) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Let-
ter from Sorgi to Powell].
17 Access charges are paid by long distance carriers to lo-
cal exchange calls when originating or terminating a long
distance call.
13 Kris HLundley, Venture with MCI gives Z-Tel a Boost, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at E6; Z-Tel and Sprint Sign
Agreement for Wholesale Services, Bus. WIRE, Feb. 4, 2003.
19 ANNA-MARIA KOVACS ET AL., COMMERCE CAPITAL MAR-
KETS EQUITY RESEARCH, The Status of 272 and UNE-Platform in
the Regional Bells' Territories, (Aug. 22, 2002).
2() ADAM QUINTON ET AL., MERRIL LYNC:H GLOBAL SECURI-
TIES RESEARCH & ECONOMICS GROUP, The Telecommunicator:
Telecom Act Seven Years On-The LNE Shock Wave Belatedly Re-
verberates Around the RBOCs - And How! (Sept. 23, 2002).
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that UNE-P pricing is "confiscatory" (i.e., a rate set
by government that is below costs and therefore
constitutes an unlawful takings under the U.S.
Constitution) .22 While economists are unlikely to
be fully convinced by such analyses (relying, as
they do, on the validity of accounting cost data
and other strong assumptions), any finding of
consistently negative margins for element sales is
a cause for concern, regardless of these caveats.
Thus, it is worthwhile to evaluate some recent
findings on this point in order to highlight the
extent to which official concern is warranted.
The issue of the remunerative quality of UNE-P
sales by the BOCs highlights several important
points relevant to any financial analysis of firm ac-
tivity. First, for reasons that need not be repeated
here, caution should be attached to all such analy-
ses that utilize accounting (rather than eco-
nomic) costs.2 3 In general, accounting costs are
not equal to economic costs, and profitability in
the economic sense is the appropriate yardstick for,
and basis of, firm decisions. Nevertheless, we cal-
culate and present the gross EBITDA24 and net
profit margins (both accounting measures of
profit) in what follows.
Second, aggregation will play an important role
in our analysis, as it does in the financial analysts'
reports we evaluate here. From a theoretical
point of view, however, any claim that element
sales are "below costs," somehow defined, must be
understood as amounting to a claim that "some
set of elements are, in fact, sold on below cost
terms." The claim that an element could be sold
"below cost" is financially irrelevant if no one ac-
tually buys the element, or buys the element in
combination with other elements priced above
costs. Further, elements sold for prices above
21 JOHN HODULICK ET AL., UBS WARBURG GLOBAL EQUITY
RESEARCH, How Much Pain From UNE-P? Analysis of UNE-P Eco-
nomics for the Bells, (Aug. 20, 2002).
22 For a primer on basic ratemaking principles, see MARK
NAFrEL & LAWRENCE J. SPIWAK, THE TELECOMS TRADE WAR:
THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WTO
(2001).
2 For a general discussion on the use of accounting
data, see STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
§17 (1993).
24 EBITDA is an acronym for Earnings Before Interest,
Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization.
25 See Section 251 Order, supra note 5, para. 683 ("For-
ward-looking cost methodologies, like TELRIC, are intended
to consider the costs that a carrier would incur in the fu-
tTre."); "We read section 252(d)(1) (A) (i) to prohibit States
from conducting traditional rate-of-return or other rate-
costs, but below cost-plus-seller-rents, will "dam-
age" the seller financially, in the same manner
that a monopolist forced to yield its position is
damaged. Damage of this sort is presumably not a
public concern per se. These distinctions are
largely unaddressed in the financial reports.
Also, as a matter of economic theory, TELRIC
pricing is not designed to reimburse the element
seller for "actual" or "embedded" costs. 25 Such
embedded costs reflect the cumulative sum of the
economic costs of resources acquired by the
BOCs over time, not the economic cost or "value"
of the elements that were created with those re-
sources. For example, a $10 steak burned to a
crisp is not worth $10, since one could obtain the
result-a lump of carbon-for less than $10. Nor
is a 100-megahertz computer worth $1,000 today,
despite the fact it sold for that amount a few years
ago. In general, the economic cost of a product is
the cost of the resources required by an efficient
producer to duplicate all the valued services pro-
vided by that product.
The determination of wholesale prices for un-
bundled elements (particularly UNE-P) by state
commissions has itself been the subject of recent
research.26 Although an earlier paper by T. Ran-
dolph Beard and George S. Ford27 shows that
prices are not determined by either the BOCs'
embedded costs or retail prices, the authors pro-
vide evidence that many state commissions set
wholesale prices at a point about halfway between
forward-looking costs (economic cost) and for-
ward-looking cost plus the average retail margin.
28
This latter value approximates the efficient com-
ponent pricing rule ("ECPR") price, ignoring the
lack of competition that gives rise to the relevant
economic rents (i.e., profits, loosely defined).
29
based proceedings to determine rates for interconnection
and access to unbundled network elements" Id. at para. 704;
"We reiterate that the prices for the interconnection and net-
work elements critical to the development of a competitive
local exchange should be based on the pro-competition, for-
ward-looking, economic costs of those elements, which may
be higher or lower than historical embedded costs" Id. at
para. 705.
26 See Beard & Ford 2002, supra note 14.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 12-19.
29 According to the ECPR, the access fee paid by the rival
to the monopolist should be "equal to the monopolist's op-
portunity costs of providing access, including any forgone
revenues from a concomitant reduction in the monopolist's
sales of the complementary component." Nicholas
Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection
[Vol. 12
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Thus, while it is correct that TELRIC does not
provide a mechanism for embedded cost recov-
ery, it has been modified in practice to allow price
increases that compensate the seller for a portion
of retail margins.
Thus, the impact of element sales on the BOCs
financial performance is a complex matter. BOCs
resistance to such sales is proof that the sales re-
duce BOCs profits. Competition inevitably erodes
excess profits and this is desirable for everyone ex-
cept for the BOCs (and, potentially, their share-
holders). 3 ° Financial analysts, such as those who
produced the Merrill Lynch analysis, are paid to
advise investors, not to promote social welfare or
competition. However, the BOCs' campaign
against the current UNE-P environment seems to
suggest that element sales actually threaten the fi-
nancial solvency of the BOCs. Such solvency does
depend on embedded costs, of course, as debt is a
current obligation for the past use of resources.
In this paper, we calculate BOC margins for
UNE-P sales that include embedded costs as con-
tained in cost data given to the FCC by the BOCs
in order to credibly evaluate the implication of
the recent analysts' studies that UNE-P is unprofit-
able for the BOCs. This analysis allows a credible
evaluation of the conclusion implied by recent
Wall Street financial analysts' reports that UNE-P
is unprofitable for the BOCs, potentially leading
to under-investment and financial ruin for these
telecommunications giants. We endeavor to mea-
sure revenues and costs as accurately as possible
given the data sources available to us. In so do-
ing, we hope to shed light on the current debate
of this matter, and potentially raise the sophistica-
tion of future studies on this topic by the financial
community.
Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule? 40
ANTITRUST BULL. 557-79 (1995).
30 See, e.g., C.K. PRAHALAD & GARY HAMEL, THE CORE
COMPETENCE OF THE CORPORATION (1994).
31 The unbundled loop is a pair of copper wires that
runs from the consumer's household to the BOCs' central
office. Switching directs a call to the intended recipient, and
if the recipient is not in the same central office as the cus-
tomer originating the call, the call must be transported over
facilities to another central office.
32 The signaling network establishes a "path" between
the originating and terminating phone, and ensures that the
receiving phone is operational. A daily usage file is a record
of call and call lengths for each individual customer. Many
installation and repair services are provided to CLECs by the
BOCs, and the CLECs compensate the BOCs for such ser-
vices by paying "non-recurring charges."
III. BOCs REVENUES FROM WHOLESALE
LOCAL EXCHANGE SERVICES
UNE-P is a combination of numerous unbun-
dled elements including primarily an unbundled
loop, unbundled switching, and unbundled trans-
port.3 ' Related elements include: signaling ser-
vices necessary to route calls, daily usage files
(describing customer calling) needed for billing
purposes, and non-recurring charges levied when
these elements are ordered, provisioned or re-
paired. 2 In some states, UNE-P CLECs also pay
the BOCs reciprocal compensation, and many
continue to use the BOCs' Operator Services and
Directory Assistance ("OS/DA"). OS/DA is pur-
chased by the CLEC as a retail service, not as an
unbundled element.33  In some states, additional
sources of revenue are present, such as the Opera-
tional Support Systems ("OSS") charge of $0.55
per line/month in New York.
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A. Sources for BOCs UNE-P Wholesale Prices
In an effort to measure BOC revenues from
UNE-P, we evaluate four sources of revenue data:
three reports from various financial analysts and
confidential data provided to the authors by Z-Tel
Communications. Z-Tel Communications ("Z-
Tel") is a CLEC that serves customers, via UNE-P,
in forty-six states. 35 Given Z-Tel's actual experi-
ence with UNE-P, and its ability to estimate costs
directly from the bills it receives from the BOCs,
we consider Z-Tel's numbers to be the best indica-
tor of BOC revenues from UNE-P.3 6 That said, Z-
Tel's experience might not be identical to that of
other CLECs using UNE-P (e.g., usage or density
zone distributions may vary among CLECs). Given
13 In. re Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report
and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16
F.C.C.R. 1724, 3891, para. 441-442 (rel. Nov. 5, 1999).
34 This charge is intended to cover the expenses in-
curred by Verizon to allow its computer systems to handle
wholesale operations. See Verizon Telephone Operating
Companies Effective Tariffs, Network Elements, pursuant to
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Tariff No. 10 §5.9.3 (on file with
authors).
35 Letter from Curtis and Koutsky to Powell, supra note
16.
'6 Z-Tel has adjusted its costs to reflect recent changes in
wholesale prices in a number of states. In many cases, Z-Tel
does not yet pay these rates to the BOCs due to lags in the




no indication that Z-Tel's experience is atypical
for a UNE-P CLEC, we consider Z-Tel's experi-
ence to be representative.
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B. Difficulties in Estimating Wholesale Prices
for UNE-P
Computing the BOCs' revenues from UNE-P is
a difficult task. Financial analysts typically com-
pute UNE-P revenues as if rates simply can be
multiplied by usage and added to flat charges, but
it is not that easy. 38 For example, switching typi-
cally consists of a flat-rated port charge, features
charges and per-minute charges. 39 In some states
(e.g., Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin), the usage
costs are included in the port charge, and in
others the feature charges are included in the
port charge. In several states, usage and features
charges are separate from the port charge. Addi-
tionally, CLECs vary in their demands for fea-
tures, and their customers are likely to vary in
their usage patterns. 40 With respect to usage, the
application of specific usage charges varies by
BOC, and frequently varies within a single BOC
region. For example, in some states, an intra-
switch call incurs two minutes of switching per
minute of conversation (e.g., West Virginia), while
in others an intra-switch call incurs only a single
minute charge per minute of use. In some states
reciprocal compensation is paid by the CLEC
(e.g., the former Ameritech states), whereas other
states have adopted a bill-and-keep arrangement.
In some states served by Verizon Communica-
tions, Inc. ("Verizon"), terminating switching and
37 Data provided by SBC to the FCC indicates that Z-Tel's
experience in the SBC region is typical, and that the distribu-
tion across density zones of UNE-P entry closely parallels the
distribution of access lines across such zones. See Ex Parte
Letter from Jay Bennett, Executive Director - Federal Regu-
latory, SBC Communications, Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, In the Matter of Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Car-
riers, CC Dkt. No. 01-338 (Oct. 11, 2002) (on file with au-
thors) [hereinafter Letter from Bennett to Dortch].
38 Charges for unbundled switching typically consist of a
flat monthly fee (a port charge) and a fee-per-minute of us-
age (usage-based charges). There may be many applicable
usage charges depending on the time the call is made, how
far the call travels and what equipment is used to send the
call to its destination. Thus, information is needed on the
total number of minutes, when calls were made and where
calls originated and terminated.
39 Charges for switch features (e.g., caller ID, call waiting,
etc.) are levied either on a per-feature or all-features basis.
40 Customers with high usage (and thus spending) stand
reciprocal compensation are treated as offsets in a
type of pseudo bill-and-keep arrangement (e.g.,
New York). In states where switching charges are
usage sensitive, the usage of the customers can
matter substantially (depending on the per-min-
ute switching rate). Computing transport cost is
particularly difficult, and the application of
charges varies substantially across states. Trans-
port costs, however, are generally a small portion
of total UNE-P revenues (typically less than five
percent for Z-Tel).
41
C. Revenue from Non-Recurring Activities
Non-recurring charges ("NRCs") are another
source of revenue for the BOCs from UNE-P, but
this revenue is frequently ignored in the analysts'
reports.42 In principle, non-recurring charges
compensate the ILEC for expenses associated
with taking orders for, and provisioning a line to,
a CLEC. For UNE-P, there are typically three cat-
egories of non-recurring costs. For ordering and
provisioning a customer, there is either a "migra-
tion" NRC or a "new install" NRC. The "migra-
tion" NRC is paid when the customer already has
service with the ILEC, whereas the "new install"
NRC is paid when the customer does not have ex-
isting service.43 Because the Automated Reporting
Management Information System ("ARMIS")
44
data includes all labor and provisioning expenses
regardless of whether such costs relate to services
provided to the ILEC itself or its CLEC customer-
competitors, the costs related to ordering and
provisioning services to CLECs are included in
the most to gain from a price decrease, so it is likely that
CLEC customers are, on average, more intense users of tele-
communications services.
41 Computed by dividing transport costs by total costs us-
ing data provided to the authors by Z-Tel Communications.
42 CCM includes some revenues for NRCs in its analysis,
but the charges appear to be grossly understated and are am-
ortized over three years (which is a relatively long customer
life and an inappropriate method by which to assess BOCs
revenue from NRCs). For purposes of comparison, the NRC
revenues are excluded from the summary figures in Table 2.
43 There are also NRCs for "change orders," such as
when a customer wants a new phone number or some other
change occurs to their account. We do not include revenues
from such activities, thus making our NRC revenues under-
stated.
44 ARMIS is the detailed cost information BOCs provide
to the FCC. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ELEC-
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the ARMIS expense data. Because the expenses
related to such activities are included in the analy-
sis on the expense side, it is therefore necessary to
include revenues from NRCs in the analysis on
the revenue side.
Publicly available information from CLECs sug-
gests that about one-third of customers are new
installs, and we assume that this is typical for the
purposes of our calculations. 45 FCC data indicates
that there were 5.6 million UNE-P lines at year-
end 2001.46 These access lines are allocated across
states based on the relative shares from the Form
477 data.47 This data indicates that UNE-P lines
increase, on average, by about 3.6% per month
(from June to December 2001) .41 Public informa-
tion suggests a monthly churn rate for UNE-P cus-
tomers of about 6.67%, which can be added to the
customer base growth rate of 3.6% for a total mi-
gration/new-install rate of about 10.25%.
49
Table 1. Average Non-Recurring Charge Revenue for UNE-P
(Excluding Change Order NRCs)
UNE-P
BOC Share Lines' Avg. NRCb Per- Line
Verizon 39% 2.19M 13.12 1.34
BellSouth 11% 0.62M 12.27 1.26
SBC 42% 2.39M 25.67 2.63
Qwest 8% 0.46M 20.37 2.09
BOC-Wide 100% 5.66M 18.73 1.92
FCC Form 477 Data (December 2001).
Z-Tel Communications.
Access line weighted NRCs by BOC (one-third
new install, two-thirds migration) are presented in
Table 1 (change order NRCs are ignored). To
compute the per-line NRC, the average BOC NRC
is multiplied by the 10.25% growth/churn rate.
45 George S. Ford, Reply Testimony on Behalf of Z-Tel
Communications, Inc. before the Indiana Utility Regulatory
Commission, (Nov. 11, 2001) (transcript on file with au-
thors).
46 U.S. TELEPHONE ASS'N, UNE FACTr REPORT (2002) at
Table 3 [hereinafter UNE FACr REPORT 2002].
47 Form 477 data is that data collected by the FCC from
CLECs and BOCs regarding the number of access lines
served and/or sold. The Form 477 data does not include
data for all States due to confidentiality concerns, so we rely
on the total number of UNE-P lines from the UNE FACT RE-
PORT 2002, supra note 46, using the State specific information
from the Form 477 data to allocate across BOCs. For details,
see FEDERAL COMMUNICATION COMMISSION, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (FAQ), ABOUT FCC FORM 477 (LOcAL COMPETI-
TION AND BROADBAND REPORTING), at http://ftp.fcc.gov/
broadband/broadband-data.faq.htmln (last modified Feb. 1,
2002).
48 Computed as the percentage increase in UNE-P access
As shown in Table 1, the average monthly revenue
per UNE-P line from NRCs is $1.92 and ranges
from $1.26 in the BellSouth Region to $2.63 in
the SBC region.
D. Wholesale Prices for UNE-P
Keeping in mind the difficulties of accurately
calculating UNE-P revenues, the estimates of
CCM, ML, UBS and Z-Tel are summarized in Ta-
ble 2. Estimates are provided at the BOC level
only, to protect (to some degree) the confidenti-
ality of the Z-Tel data. Table 2 illustrates the size-
able understatement of UNE-P revenues by the fi-
nancial analysts. Z-Tel pays the BOCs about 43%
more than the UBS estimates, 30% more than the
ML estimates and 11% more than the CCM esti-
mates (without NRCs). These differences may
emerge from differences in the distribution of
loop rates across density zones, different usage
patterns, different assumptions regarding the
number of features purchased, the exclusion of
costs related to some elements, and various other
reasons. 5°1 CLECs have indicated that usage is one
primary detriment of the differences between ac-
tual costs and the costs estimated by the analysts.
5 1
Also observe (in Table 2) that, on average, the
inclusion of the NRC revenue increases BOC reve-
nues from UNE-P by about 9%. Overall, actual
CLEC experience suggests that the revenues re-
ceived by BOCs are considerably higher than the
financial analysts' estimates indicate. This general
understatement of revenues by financial analysts
is important since when evaluating EBITDA mar-
gins (or any margin for that matter), small
lines across states between June and December 2001 (divided
by six to produce a monthly growth rate).
4" The estimated churn rate of about 6.7% is based on
Comments of Kimberly Scardino, Senior Counsel,
WorldCom, Inc., In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obli-
gations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, CC Dkt. No. 01-
338 (Nov. 15, 2002) (on file with authors).
50 The loop rate is the charge for the copper wire that
runs from the consumer's household or business to the
BOCs' central offices. It is a flat, monthly recurring price and
has no usage-sensitive price component. Differences in loop
rates explain about $0.36 of the difference between Z-Tel
and CCM, on average. UBS assumes 80% of access lines are
in the Urban (Zone 1) density zone. Recent SBC data sug-
gests that only 25% of UNE-P lines are in the Urban zone.
See Letter from Bennett to Dortch, supra, note 37.
51 See, e.g., Letter from Crtis and Koutsky to Powell,
supra note 16; Letter from Sorgi to Powell, supra note 16.
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changes in revenues or costs are reflected directly
in the margin.
Table 2. BOC Specific UNE-P Revenues Per Line
(Dollars per line/month)
UBS ML CCM Z-TEL
Without NRC Revenue
Verizon 15.08 17.29 20.20 23.08
BellSouth 18.79 19.97 24.38 31.54
SBC 13.98 15.02 17.31 17.94
Qwest 18.53 21.05 23.98 22.54
BOC-Wide 15.75 17.37 20.30 22.51
With NRC Revenue
Verizon 16.43 18.63 21.54 24.43
BellSouth 20.05 21.23 25.64 32.80
SBC 16.61 17.65 19.94 20.57
Qwest 20.61 23.14 26.07 24.63
BOC-Wide 17.67 19.29 22.22 24.43
Weighted averages based on switched access lines from ARMIS data
(2001), and therefore may be slightly different from those reported
in the respective analysts reports.
There are two methods by which the quality of
the analysts' estimates can be evaluated, and these
two methods are best appliedjointly. First, we can
evaluate the average revenue (at the BOC level)
to determine how close the estimates are to actual
experience. Table 2 provides such a comparison
and indicates the financial analysts' estimates of
revenue are far below the actual experience of a
UNE-P CLEC. Second, we consider the fact that
the BOCs average revenues are averages of state-
level UNE-P revenues per line. Because a good
estimate of a BOC's average revenue from a UNE-
P line could arise from state-level revenue esti-
mates that are entirely unrelated to what CLECs
actually pay, we also examine the correlation be-
tween the state-level revenue estimates and actual
experience. 52 A high positive correlation would
suggest that the Wall Street analysts' estimates
may accurately reflect a BOC's average UNE-P rev-
enue per line. The correlation matrix is provided
in Table 3. Although the correlation coefficients
between the analysts' estimates and Z-Tel's actual
experience are positive, the correlations are not
very large (i.e., not close to 1.00 which indicates
perfect correlation). Thus, the analysts' estimates
52 For example, the number pairs (10, 20) and (25, 5)
both average to $15, but the average is based on very differ-
ent underlying values.
53 The EBITDA margin equals revenue minus all ex-
penses except for interest, taxes, depreciation and amortiza-
tion. Thus, increases in revenue, holding expenses constant,
are poor reflections of actual revenues from UNE-
P under both evaluation methods.
Considering both the level and correlation of
the analysts' estimates to actual experience, the
"best" analyst estimate of UNE-P revenues is pro-
vided by CCM, which underestimates Z-Tel's ac-
tual experience by about 11% and has a correla-
tion coefficient of 0.68 (excluding NRCs). Most
of this difference is observed in the BellSouth re-
gion. Even though 10% may seem to be a rela-
tively small difference, the additional $2.21 in rev-
enue it represents is important when computing
EBITDA margins.53 Further, on a state-specific ba-
sis, there may be very large differences that are
masked in the average (but revealed to some de-
gree by the correlation coefficient). For example,
in one state, CCM underestimates Z-Tel's whole-
sale prices by 56%. 5 4 In seven out of forty-six
states (15%), CCM understates BOC wholesale
prices by 25% or more. 55 In some cases, CCM
overstates BOC wholesale prices (but none by as
much as 25%). Overall, CCM understates BOC
revenues for 65% of states with an average under-
statement of 16%, whereas CCM overstates reve-
nues for 35% of states with an average overstate-
ment of 8%.
Table 3. UNE-P Revenues Correlation Matrix
CCM ML UBS ZTEL
CCM 1.00 0.87 0.66 0.68
ML 0.87 1.00 0.77 0.64
UBS 0.66 0.77 1.00 0.57
ZTEL 0.68 0.64 0.57 1.00
Regardless of the source of the revenue esti-
mates, SBC clearly has the lowest per-line revenue
from UNE-P of the four BOCs (see Table 2),
driven primarily by the low UNE-P rates in the for-
mer Ameritech region. BellSouth has the highest
UNE-P revenues per line according to CCM and
Z-Tel, and Z-Tel data indicates that BellSouth's
rates embody high charges for switch features and
the daily usage file, charges that do not appear to
be properly accounted for by UBS, ML and CCM.
For example, in Alabama, the switch features (as a
increase EBITDA.
54 Computed as the percentage difference -between the
average cost-per-line as reported by Z-Tel and CCM.
55 Based on a state-by-state comparison of the average
UNE-P costs reported by Z-Tel and CCM.
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bundle) have a wholesale price of $5.55 and the
switch port is $2.07 (for a port/features total of
$7.62, not including usage). 56 Yet, the CCM data
lists switching costs in Alabama (including usage
and transport) of only $5.46, UBS lists $4.67, and
ML lists $3.77. Clearly, the financial analysts have
not estimated UNE-P revenues correctly (at least
for some states). Understating revenues, even by
a small amount, is a non-trivial matter when com-
puting EBITDA margins on a BOC- or state-level
basis.
IV. RETAIL AND WHOLESALE COSTS PER
ACCESS LINE
Through ARMIS, the BOCs report detailed cost
information to the FCC. This data is highly disag-
gregated, unlike the financial forms submitted to
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Using
this data, we compute the average retail and
wholesale cost per line for each BOC. The
ARMIS does not, however, directly allocate costs
between retail and wholesale functions. To com-
pute wholesale costs, we exclude, as best we can,
costs associated with the provision of retail ser-
vices by the BOC. Once the wholesale costs are
computed, we can then compare these wholesale
costs to revenues received from CLECs using
UNE-P.
A. Wholesale Operating Expenses
BOC expenses related primarily to the provi-
sion of switched access line services are summa-
rized in ARMIS Form 43-01 (Year 2001) ("Form
43-01") .57 The major categories of operating costs
from Form 43-01 are summarized in Table 4. We
include only costs that are allocated in Form 43-01
to "Common Line" (i.e., loops), "Traffic Sensitive
Switching," and "Traffic Sensitive Transport."
58
These expenses are summarized for the interstate
portion alone in ARMIS, so we convert these to
total expenses by dividing the reported expenses
56 See Agreement between BellSouth Telecommunica-
tions Inc. and Z-Tel Telecommunications Inc., June 2000, at
168, 171 (on file with authors).
57 Other Forms provide similar information, often at a
higher or lower level of aggregation.
58 Basic telephone service, such as UNE-P, includes
loops, switching and transport network elements.
59 These calculations follow exactly those made by a
BOCs expert witness. See Dr. Debra J. Aron, Testimony on
by the appropriate separations factor: Common
Line expenses are divided by 0.25, switching ex-
penses are divided by the ratio of interstate to to-
tal ("Subject to Separations") dial equipment min-
utes ("DEMS"), and transport expenses are di-
vided by twice the aforementioned DEMS ratio.
5'9
The operating costs listed in Table 4 are further
disaggregated in other ARMIS forms, including
ARMIS Forms 43-03 and 43-04. Our analysis is
limited to the summary categories only, with the
exception of "Plant Non-Specific" expenses,
which contains some cost elements that should be
allocated between wholesale and retail segments.
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1185 FCC Expense Adjustment
1190 Total Operating Expenses
While Form 43-01 provides expense data at the
state level, it appears that the allocation of ex-
penses across states does not allow for reasonable
state-specific estimates of expenses to be com-
puted. For example, negative expenses are listed
in some cases. 60 Also, expenses of nearly all types
appear to be over-allocated to New York, Georgia,
Texas and Colorado-states where the BOC's cor-
porate headquarters are located. 6' ARMIS in-
cludes a substantial degree of allocation across
states, and we wish to avoid to the greatest extent
possible any arbitrariness that may accompany
such allocations. Thus, we compute expenses and
profit margins at the BOC level.
All "Plant Specific" expenses are included in
our measure of wholesale costs. Since some of
these costs may be related to data services, this as-
sumption, if anything, overstates actual wholesale
Behalf of Southwestern Bell Telephone L.P. d/b/a South-
western Bell, Before Public Utility Commission of Texas,
Texas Dkt. No. 25834 (Nov. 4, 2002) (transcript on file with
authors). The DEMS factors are computed from ARMIS
Form 43-04, Row 1216.
60 For example, Corporate Operations Expenses (ARMIS
Form 43-04, Row 1160) in Missouri are negative.
61 Headquarter states are New York (Verizon), Georgia
(BellSouth), Texas (SBC) and Colorado (Qwest).
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expenses per line. From "Plant Non-Specific" ex-
penses, we exclude costs related to Terminal
Equipment, and half of those costs related to art-
work, furniture, general computers and similar
items are assigned to the retail segment.62 "Corpo-
rate Operations" expenses are assigned using an
expense allocation factor, where the factor is
equal to the adjusted plant expenses divided by
total expenses (excluding "Corporate Opera-
tions" and "Depreciation"). 63 "Access" expenses
are a retail expense.64 Depreciation is a capital
expense and is discussed in the next section.
While the wholesale segment of the BOC does
not have retail customers, it will have wholesale
customers. For each BOC, we assume that the
wholesale customer service and billing operations
is equal in size to the BOC's current expenses re-
lated to the billing and collection of access
charges from interexchange carriers (a wholesale
function). ARMIS Form 43-01 provides this ex-
pense data.
65
B. Wholesale Capital Costs
Positive EBITDA margins do not guarantee ac-
62 These expenses are detailed in ARMIS Form 43-03,
Rows 6121, 6122, 6123, and 6124. Terminal equipment is not
related to the provision of UNE-P services.
63 The average allocation factor is 69%, so much of Cor-
porate Operations is assigned to the wholesale segment.
64 Access expenses are reported as zero in ARMIS Form
43-01 for "Common Line" and "Traffic Sensitive" cost catego-
ries.
65 We include total expenses in the "Billing and Collec-
tion" category from ARMIS Form 43-01.
66 The return to capital is never included as an expense
category in financial reporting, and depreciation and amorti-
zation are left out of EBITDA because neither is a cash ex-
pense.
67 Switched access lines are increased by 5% to account
for unbundled lines that are excluded from ARMIS data. See
Dr. DebraJ. Aron, Supplemental Response to RFI No. 1-la,
Texas Dkt No. 25834, request No. 1, at 8 (Nov. 4, 2002) (on
file with authors). SBC reported that its net plant for analog
access is $499 per line in the former Ameritech region. See Ex
Parte Letter from Brian J. Benison, Associate Director-Fed-
eral Regulatory, SBC Telecommunications, Inc., to Marlene
H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, In the matter of Review of the
Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Ex-
change Carriers, CC Dkt. No. 01-338 (Oct. 30, 2002) at 3 (on
file with authors). Our computations compute a net plant
for this region of $550. Thus, we adjust the net plant calcula-
tions downward to 91% of the computed value from ARMIS
to produce an estimate for analog dialtone lines.
68 The capital charge factor is [(1 - A(N, r)(t/A))]/[(1 -
t)A(N,r)], where t is the tax rate, Nis the depreciation life,
A(N,r) is the present value of a $1 annuity for N years com-
puted at the after-tax rate of return equal to r percent. De-
counting profitability, as costs associated with cap-
ital investment (depreciation and a return to capi-
tal) are left out of the calculations."' 3 Profitability
can be assessed, however, by including levelized
capital expenses per access line in the analysis.
ARMIS Form 43-01 provides average net plant
data (Year 2001) for the "Common Line" and
"Traffic Sensitive" cost categories, which are con-
verted to a per-line net plant by application of the
allocation factors to produce total net investment
and then dividing by switched access lines.67 Net
plant is converted into a monthly capital payment
by multiplying net plant by the annual capital
charge factor and dividing by twelve. Application
of the annual capital charge factor to investment
produces a monthly payment that includes the de-
preciation and return on the investment, includ-
ing the tax effects. 68
C. Summary of Cost Estimates
Table 5 summarizes the BOC-specific and BOC-
wide average retail and wholesale operating and
total expenses.69 Retail expenses per line are esti-
mated to be $20.90 per line, which is comparable
preciation life is computed as the inverse of the percentage
of net plant depreciated each year (i.e., the ratio of the
change in accumulated depreciation and net plant). Accord-
ing to ARMIS Form 43-02, accumulated depreciation is about
10% of net plant per year on average, implying a 10-year de-
preciation life. The depreciation life varies by BOCs (Ver-
izon: nine years; BellSouth: ten years; SBC: eleven years;
Qwest: twelve years). The tax rate is computed from the
BOCs' Form 10-K. The cost of capital is based on the follow-
ing assumptions: (a) the cost of short-term debt is 1.31%,
which is the yield on 3-Month Non-Financial Commercial Pa-
per in December 2002; (b) the average of A and AA rated
corporate bonds in December 2002; (c) an average of the
cost of equity of 7.52% computed using the Discounted Cash
Flow ("DCF") method (which, in is most basic form, sets the
cost of equity equal to the dividend yield plus the expected
growth rate in earnings or dividends) using the average of
the BOCs dividend yields and consensus growth estimates as
of December 2002 (data can be researched at REUTERS IN-
V'ESTER at http://www.multexinvestor.com); and (d) a capital
structure of 40% debt and 60% equity, with short-term debt
making up 20% of debt. As of December 2002, the inputs for
the DCF method were (Dividend Yield, Long-term Growth):
Verizon (3.89%, 4.08%), BellSouth (2.95%, 4.06%) and SBC
(3.74%, 3.85%). Given the publicly disclosed problems with
Qwest's financial statements, we exclude Qwest from the
computation. The capital charge factor is computed for each
BOCs, and is based on an average cost of capital of 6.39%.
69 Retail costs are computed using ARMIS Form 43-03.
Based on the allocations in ARMIS Form 43-01, we assume
75% of expenses in this form are allocated to switched access
lines (25% to special access lines). Depreciation is excluded
as it is a capital cost.
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to ML's estimate of $19.95 and UBS's estimate of
$19.10.71) Wholesale operating expenses per line
range between $9.49 to $10.91 across BOCs, and
average $10.15. In every case, wholesale operat-
ing costs are considerably less than the estimates
of either ML ($17.46) or UBS ($17.02). 7 Table 5
suggests that wholesale costs equal about 50% of
retail costs, not the 12.5% assumed by ML or the
11% assumed by UBS. 72 Moreover, UBS's as-
sumed avoided cost of 11% is barely sufficient to
account for unquestionably avoidable expenses
such as sales, marketing, and customer service.
Clearly, the financial analysts have substantially
overstated wholesale costs.
Capital costs average $7.32 per line/month,
ranging from $6.42 to $9.35. Total wholesale ex-
penses per line-including capital costs-are
$17.55 on average. Total wholesale expenses are
about 38% less than total retail expenses per line/
month, on average. BellSouth has the highest
and SBC has the lowest total wholesale expense.
This relation holds for UNE-P revenues as well,
though BellSouth's revenue advantage substan-
tially exceeds the cost differential.
Table 5. BOC Retail and Wholesale Costs
Wholesale Total Total
Retail Operating Net Capital Retail Wholesale
Costs Expense Investment Expense Expense Expense
Verizon 20.69 10.80 517.82 7.15 27.84 17.95
BellSouth 21.41 10.91 726.28 9.35 30.76 20.27
SBC 21.44 9.49 529.82 6.42 27.86 15.91
Qwest 19.03 9.55 671.79 7.72 26.75 17.27
BOC-Wide 20.90 10.15 578.45 7.32 28.22 17.47
Considering the systematic understatement of
UNE-P revenues and the overstatement of whole-
sale costs, it is no surprise that the analysts find
the UNE-P wholesale business unprofitable for
the BOCs. We have made clear here, however,
that the analysts' findings are (at least partially)
70 The similarities are not surprising, given that ML uses
BOCs aggregate data from the FCC STATISTICS OF COMMUNI-
CATIONS COMMON CARRIERS (2001), which is based on the
ARMIS data. For State-level estimates of costs, ML simply ad-
justs the BOCs-wide average operational costs in direct pro-
portion to differences in revenues across States (i.e., the re-
tail EBITDA margin is equal in every State). UBS computes
average retail costs by assuming a constant EBITDA margin
(across States within a BOCs region) on retail revenues, ig-
noring actual cost data.
71 CCM also provides cost estimates, but these estimates
exceed retail revenues (with costs averaging about $45 per
line). Consequently, we do not believe these estimates are
credible or worthy of a detailed evaluation. CCM also in-
cludes ARMIS depreciation expenses, which are notoriously
the result of poorly estimated revenues and ex-
penses, and consequently provide little informa-
tion of value either in an investment or policy
context.
Table 6. Marginal Effects of Assumptions on
Wholesale Costs
(Dollar change for a one percentage-point
change in assumption)
Corporate Cost of Avoided Non-Plant
Operations Capital Specific
Verizon 0.036 0.38 .020
BellSouth 0.026 0.54 .017
SBC 0.015 0.39 .029
Qwest 0.027 0.50 .022
BOC-Wide 0.025 0.43 .023
Many alternative assumption sets could be used
to compute estimates of wholesale costs. In our
computations, we attempted to limit the number
of assumptions as much as possible. To assess the
effect of alternative assumptions, the "marginal ef-
fects" of each input are summarized in Table 6.
For example, the last cell in column two of Table
6 indicates that for every one percentage-point
change in "Corporate Operations" expenses allo-
cated to wholesale lines, the monthly per-line
wholesale operating costs increase by $0.025 at
the BOC-wide level. 73 The last cell of column five
indicates that a one percentage-point increase in
the allocation of furniture, artwork, general com-
puters and so forth to wholesale service, increases
wholesale costs by about $0.023 (at the BOC-wide
level).7 4 The other cells in the table are inter-
preted in the same manner.
V. REVENUES, EXPENSES, AND THE
EBITDA MARGIN
To evaluate the accounting profitability (not eco-
incorrect and substantially different from depreciation re-
ported in financial statements. See ANNA-MARIA KOVACS ET
AL., COMMERCE CAPITAL MARKETS STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS
OF UNE-PuATFORM IN REGIONAL BELL MARKETS (2001).
72 Note that the avoided cost discounts computed using
the ARMIS data are not directly comparable to the Total Ser-
vice Resale discounts; those discounts are applied to reve-
nues, not costs. Additionally, the ILECs continue to incur
costs for resellers that are avoided for UNE-P (e.g., Access
Expenses).
73 The average allocation is 69% of Corporation Opera-
tions to wholesale services.




nomic profitability) of the wholesale UNE-P rela-
tive to its retail equivalent, the gross (EBITDA)
and net profit margins for UNE-P wholesale ser-
vices sold by the BOCs are computed. 75 These
margins equal the difference between UNE-P rev-
enues from Table 2 and the wholesale costs from
Table 5. A minimum requirement for accounting
profitability, on average, is that the revenues from
a service cover the operating expenses incurred in
providing it, excluding any costs associated with
capital investment. A positive gross margin indi-
cates that this minimal standard of accounting
profitability is met. The net margin is an indica-
tor of actual profitability. The margins, presented
for each BOC, are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. EBITDA Margins for BOC Wholesale Services (UN-P)
Gross Total Implied
UNE-P Wholesale (EBITDA) Wholesale Net Return
Revenues Costs Margin Expense Margin (Pre Tax)
Verizon 24.43 10.80 13.63 17.95 6.48 21%
BellSouth 32.80 10.91 21.89 20.27 12.53 26%
SBC 20.57 9.49 11.08 15.91 4.66 17%
Qwest 24.63 9.55 15.08 17.27 7.36 19%
BOC-Wide 24.43 10.15 14.28 17.47 6.96 20%
On average, the average gross margin for the
BOCs is $14.28, or 58% of wholesale revenues. 76
The margins vary substantially, with the largest
margins found in the BellSouth region ($21.89)
and the smallest in the SBC region ($11.08).
Considering its relative low gross margins on
wholesale services, SBC's leadership role in attack-
ing UNE-P and TELRIC is unsurprising.
Including capital expenses in the computation
of wholesale margins, which results in an estimate
of excess return, does not alter the conclusions-
wholesale margins remain positive. On average,
the wholesale net margin is $6.96, or 28% of reve-
nues. Again, SBC has the lowest margin ($4.66)
and BellSouth the highest ($12.53). Implied re-
turns to capital are summarized in the final col-
umn of Table 7. These implied returns are com-
puted by increases in the assumed cost of capital
until net income is zero. On average, the return
to capital for wholesale access lines is 20%. Thus,
75 Generally, accounting costs do not equal economic
costs, particularly for capital expense components of finan-
cial data. SeeJEREMy EDWARDS ET AL., THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF ACCOUNTING PROFITABILITY (1987).
76 These margins are generally consistent with those re-
ported in Beard & Ford 2002, supra note 14, which reports an
average EBITDA margin of 40%. The differences in the mar-
gins are attributed mostly to the use of the CCM revenue
from the perspective of a wholesale provider of
telecommunications plant, UNE-P is profitable.
VI. VALIDATION
Our analysis of wholesale costs indicates that,
on average, the wholesale cost for a switched ac-
cess line (i.e., the type of line relevant to UNE-P)
is $10 and depreciation/amortization expenses
are about $7 on a per-line basis. These estimates
suggest that current/embedded total wholesale
expenses per line are about $17.
Ideally, there would be some way to validate our
estimates with real-world experience. Recent
statements by SBC's Chief Financial Officer, Ran-
dall Stephenson, provide such validation. Specifi-
cally, at the Bank of America Securities 32nd An-
nual Investment Conference in September 2002,
Mr. Stephenson stated: "[in] Texas, it's about a
$20 [to] $21 UNE-P. [In] Texas, you have a pretty
rational model. [A]t $20 [to] $21, you have good,
vibrant competition and it's not at such a level
where we cannot earn money or are disincented
to invest."
' 77
Our estimates suggest that with $20 to $21 in
UNE-P revenues per line, the BOCs are fully com-
pensated for their wholesale operating costs and
depreciation/amortization expenses. So, our esti-
mates are consistent with the statement that "at
$20 to $21" the BOCs can "earn money" and are
not "disincented to invest." In fact, SBC earns
about a 19% return for UNE-P revenue of about
$20.50 (see Table 7). On average, BOCs would
earn a return of 15% at UNE-P revenues of $20.50
per line/month.
Mr. Stephenson also indicated that a UNE-P
price of $14 is "below cost. '78 Thus, it is reasona-
ble to conclude that SBC views its wholesale costs
per UNE-P line as somewhere between $14 and
$20. Our estimated average wholesale cost of
about $15.97 for SBC and $17.42 for all BOCs is
again consistent with the claims of one BOC's
Chief Financial Officer.
data in the earlier paper and to differences in the computa-
tion of wholesale costs per line.
77 Randall Stephenson, Remarks at the Bank of America
Securities 32nd Annual Investment Conference (Sept. 23-26,
2002) (transcript at http://www.telepolicy.com/randall.pdf).
78 Id. (stating that "it is well below cost on anybody's cost
modeling assumptions" and "you cannot get to a $14 UNE
price").
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We reiterate, however, that according to FCC
policy, wholesale prices should not be set such
that the BOCs "earn money" at the current level
of expenses. Wholesale prices are based on
TELRIC, and TELRIC may be above or below cur-
rent expenses. The positive gross and net mar-
gins summarized in this paper suggest that
TELRIC, as interpreted and implemented by state
regulatory commissions, is typically above embed-
ded costs.
An alternate validation is provided in a recent
decision by the Massachusetts Department of
Telecommunications and Energy.79 Under the
Department's assumptions, the difference in re-
tail and wholesale costs for a Total Service Resale
("TSR") line is 25.51%.80 For a TSR line, however,
the BOC incurs costs that are not born for a UNE-
P line. For example, access charges are paid by
the CLEC for a UNE-P line, whereas those
charges are paid by the ILEC for a TSR line. Also,
operator services may be provided by a third-party
vendor for UNE-P lines, so these costs may be
avoided for UNE-P even though incurred for a
TSR. If access charges and operator service ex-
penses are properly considered avoided for a
UNE-P customer, then the avoided retail costs in
Massachusetts are 46.5% of retail expenses. In-
cluding operator services lowers the difference to
41.3%. From Table 5, the wholesale costs com-
puted using the methodology described in this pa-
per renders a difference between wholesale and
retail expenses for Verizon of 47.3%. Obviously,
these wholesale-retail cost differences are very
similar, and provide further validation of the rea-
sonableness of our calculations and estimates.
Finally, prices in competitive markets tend to
cost and the goal of TELRIC was to mimic the
competitive price. As a consequence, the rela-
tionship of TELRIC to "cost" could be assessed if
TELRIC-based prices could be compared to com-
petitive prices for analogous services. Since un-
bundled elements are typically those components
79 Order on Verizon Massachusetts' Compliance Filing,
D.T.E. 01-20-Part A-B (May 29, 2003).
80 Id. at 26. The Department ordered a TSR discount of
25.51%, whereas Verizon proposed a TSR discount of 22%.
Id. at 16.
81 This price is computed using a fixed fee of $711.09
per circuit and a mileage charge of $15.21 per mile. Letter
from Henry Hultquist, Worldcom, Inc. to Marlene Dortch,
Federal Communications Commission, at Attach. (Oct. 29,
2002) (on file with authors). Mileage of 185 miles is based
on the distance between the airports of the two cities. See
of the network subject to monopoly conditions,
such comparisons are rare. However, some analo-
gies are available. For example, consider the rela-
tive prices of a DS3 circuit (a high capacity cir-
cuit) between New York City and Albany, New
York. At the Verizon-New York TELRIC-based
prices, this circuit would cost about $3,500 per
month.8' This same circuit, however, would cost
only about $2,200 if purchased from a competitive
provider.8 2 This same circuit, however, would cost
only about $2,200 if purchased from a competitive
provider. This relationship between a competitive
price and TELRIC was recently affirmed by Wil-
liam C. Deere, a former employee and consultant
for SBC. In a recent deposition, Mr. Deere ac-
knowledged "They may be better than TELRIC
[prices] if there are [ ] competitive facilities avail-
able .... If there's competition there, it's probably
lower than our rates."83 These examples provide
corroborating evidence that TELRIC may be
above the "actual" cost of providing unbundled el-
ements.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent reports on the financial consequences
of UNE-P sales for Bell Operating Companies
have drawn additional attention to long-standing
complaints by the BOCs that such sales are confis-
catory and amount to subsidized competition. Of
course, no one expects incumbent firms to sup-
port any sort of unbundling at prices that a com-
petitor would be willing to pay. Nevertheless,
there is an important distinction between man-
dated unbundled element sales that are unwel-
come, and mandated sales that actually threaten
the viability of the incumbent providers. The
BOCs' complaints establish that unbundled ele-
ment sales are unwelcome, but not that they are,
in any relevant sense, "below cost."
A number of recent financial studies find that
mandated UNE-P sales produce losses for the in-
CONVERTIT.COM, at http://www.converit.com. This calcula-
tion is illustrative, since this circuit could not actually be pur-
chased as an unbundled element because it crosses LATA
boundaries.
82 The competitive price was provided by BANDWIDTH
MARKET, LTD., at http://www.bandwithmarket.com.
83 Deposition of William C. Deere, In re Implementation
of the Federal Communications Commission's Triennial Re-
view Regarding Local Circuit Switching in the Mass Market,
Ohio Public Utilities Commission, Case No. 03-2040-TP-COI
(Nov. 19, 2003), at 73.
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cumbents, and that these losses, despite long-
standing claims about the excessive profitability of
long distance markets, are not offset through in-
region, long distance operations permitted under
the Section 271 process.8 4 The financial analyses
by Merrill Lynch, UBS and others described in
this paper, however, are designed specifically to
provide investment advice and, as such, are not
useful for evaluating the social impacts of re-
quired element sales. Indeed, from the investor's
point-of-view, a firm that gained a monopoly
might represent an excellent opportunity, al-
though it is incorrect to argue from these prem-
ises that society should welcome such a develop-
ment. On the other hand, financial analyses do
serve a useful purpose, and the survival of the Bell
companies is presumably a matter of concern for
regulators and the public, as well as Wall Street.
This paper subjects the conclusions of these fi-
nancial studies to careful scrutiny and finds that
they are largely without merit. Errors in both the
calculation of unbundled element revenues, and
in the wholesale costs of providing unbundled ele-
ments, are identified. Using actual payments by a
representative CLEC, we find that revenues ordi-
narily reported in financial analyses are substan-
tially understated. These understatements arise
from several sources, including omission of cer-
tain nonrecurring charges, incorrect assumptions
on the mix of loops purchased by competitors,
and so on.
On the cost side, the publicly available ARMIS
84 Telecommunications Act of 1996 §271.
85 See H. R. REP. No. 104-458, preamble (1996) (stating
data can be used to construct measures of cur-
rents costs for wholesale element sales in a man-
ner conceptually consistent with Bell protestations
on these matters. While such costs are not eco-
nomic costs, neither are they hypothetical. In-
stead, they represent costs incurred by the incum-
bents and, therefore, are relevant for financial
analyses of the type under discussion. We care-
fully obtain realistic cost figures usable for finan-
cial analyses. We do not use TELRIC costs, nor do
we seek to identify the costs of efficient forward-
looking network operations.
Our analysis suggests that positive gross and net
margins are the rule when costs and revenues are
aggregated to the level of the BOC. Even the in-
clusion of depreciation and a return to capital
does not materially alter this conclusion-UNE-P
is profitable to the BOCs.
Concerns over the profitability of unbundled el-
ement sales reflect a widespread recognition that
such sales are less profitable than an indefinite re-
tention of monopoly power. While the BOCs
would surely be better off if they were not re-
quired to accommodate competition (for a variety
of reasons), the emergence of effective competi-
tion in local markets is the primary policy goal of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 85 Regula-
tory actions that derail the unbundling process
are tantamount to abandonment of the Act's
goals. In fact, declining margins are a hallmark of
competition and a signal that the Act's implemen-
tation is promoting the desired effects.
that the bill is "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regula-
tory national policy framework . . . ").
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